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ABSTRACT
Linked Data technologies become increasingly important in
many domains. Key factors for their breakthrough are secu-
rity and trust, especially when sensible or personal data are
involved. Classical means for access control lack granularity
when parts of the Linked Data graph must be protected.
The WebID, combining semantic web concepts with meth-
ods from certificate based authentication and authorization,
seems promising to fulfill all requirements concerning secu-
rity and trust in the semantic web.
In the context of the PerSemID project, we challenged the
WebID technology in a practical scenario coming from the
domain of lifelong learning and student mobility. In our use
case of study enrollment, we use WebIDs for authentication
and to grant access to parts of the triple stores of the differ-
ent stakeholders. Cross domain triple store interactions are
used to exchange data between the involved parties. Our
fully implemented PoC exemplifies an application built on
Linked Data and WebID and allows us to judge the usability
and security of WebID technology in a real world scenario.
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy→Authentication; Access con-
trol; Authorization; Social network security and pri-
vacy; Usability in security and privacy;
Keywords
Semantic Web, WebID, Linked Data, Access Control, Au-
thentication, Authorization
1. INTRODUCTION
The PerSemID project[1] at Bern University of Applied
Sciences (BFH) has been set up to drive the research con-
ducted in the CV3.0 project[2] further and to investigate two
particular aspects remaining open in practical applications
of the WebID[3] technology.
Having a strong focus on security and trust, we have been
looking for a validation of WebID specifically regarding au-
thentication and authorization. While not questioning its
general security properties – as they are implied by the un-
derlying mechanisms based on client certificate authentica-
tion given by TLS1 – we have considered the question of
trust, or more specifically the question of level of assurance
(LoA)[4, 5] in WebIDs to be in need of a more thorough
1Transport Layer Security
inspection. The LoA, a concept increasingly used in iden-
tity and access management, states a quality level regarding
the authentication – by which means did it take place and
how qualified is it? As everyone can operate infrastructure
to issue WebIDs, the significant question is, what differen-
tiates one WebID from another and why (or how) a trust
relation to a WebID can be built. To answer this question,
we looked at ways to integrate and/or interlink WebID with
other, established systems for trust and authentication. In
particular, we have explored the integration of WebID into
SuisseID[6], Switzerland’s national electronic ID.
The second open aspect concerns the application of WebID
for access control to resources, operated by independent par-
ties and in distributed environments. Here, we focused on
triple stores and platforms for document management.
To conduct the research needed to answer above points as
close as possible to real world applications, we have devised
a use case in the domain of lifelong learning and student mo-
bility: enabling Linked Data usage for administrative pro-
cesses in enrollment for studies. Here, our work led to a
complete implementation as a proof-of-concept prototype
(PoC) which can be used to interactively explore the sce-
narios which were the basis of our open questions regarding
WebID. Even though being specifically tailored to academic
institutions, the concepts developed in this prototype can
easily be adapted to similar processes and needs in other
environments.
In this paper, we present the results we have obtained for
the given questions. After discussing the related work in
Section 2, we describe the basic principles of WebID and
detail our work made in strengthening the LoA in WebID
in Section 3. In Section 4, we describe the implemented
prototype for distributed resources protected using WebID.
Finally, we conclude our work by summarizing key points
and looking forward to future expectations in this area.
2. RELATEDWORK
The PerSemID project lies at the intersection of two do-
mains: identity and access management (IAM), as well as
Linked Data and semantic web based technologies with a
focus on attribute transfer and document management.
Identity and access management in itself is a very broad
area covering many aspects in information technology re-
lated to identity, trust, authentication and access. As this
project was directly succeeding the CV3.0 project, further
work based on WebID was directly mandated by the project
proposal; due to this, we did not inspect other technologies
for access management.
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We compared our aims to other projects and resources
which are closely related to our main objective: having
WebID authentication in cross-domain triple store interac-
tion for Linked Data and documents. We will now present
the most important related work that we have found.
First, a part of the thesis by Santomauro[7] consists of the
SuisseID integration performed in our project. However, the
thesis itself is not part of it.
Web Access Control[8] is one of the first approaches in pro-
viding authorization based on WebIDs. Its working principle
is based on access control lists (ACLs) which map WebIDs
to HTTP resources and define possible access types like read
and write.
Universal Access Control (UAC)[9], which we have used
in prototypes for CV3.0, goes further and provides access
control at the level of individual triples.
Like UAC, the Privacy Preference Ontology[10] provides
access control at triple level as well.
WebID+ACO[11] is an ontology for authorization which
primarily focuses on adding a role-based authorization model
to HTTP.
S4AC[12] is a vocabulary for creating access control poli-
cies focusing on named graphs. S4AC is used by the SHI3LD
project[13] for specifying permissions. SHI3LD is an attribute-
based authorization layer with focus on the Linked Data
platform and mobile devices.
The former MyProfile project offered an IDP-service for
WebID as well as a platform for social networking. At the
time of writing, online resources of MyProfile are not avail-
able anymore. However, detailed information can be found
in the thesis of Sambra[14].
Recently, a new initiative called Solid[15] seems to take
up on the work of MyProfile. It is also built around WebID
as central means of authentication within a social, Linked
Data environment.
3. WEBID
In this section, we will first give a short introduction to
WebID. We then describe our motivation regarding linking
and strengthening WebID and the research conducted for
this. Finally, we will close with an overview of concerns
regarding practical applicability of WebID.
3.1 Basic Working Principle and Motivation
In a nutshell, WebID authentication builds on the authen-
tication of a client using X.509[16] client certificates. Func-
tionality for using such certificates is present in all major
browsers (albeit with quite a rudimentary user experience).
To deliver additional information (for example in the form
of personal attributes) and to establish a URI as an identi-
ficator for a particular entity, WebID references a so-called
FOAF profile[17] using a standard extension of X.509 certifi-
cates (the Subject Alternate Name (SAN) field). Figure 1
gives a highlevel overview of authentication using WebID.
On the left, the client (identified by its X.509 client cer-
tificate with corresponding key pair) wants to authenticate
to an application running on the (web-)server. The web-
server retrieves the FOAF profile referenced in the SAN-
field of the certificate and compares the information about
the public key given in it against the information obtained
from the client certificate in the TLS handshake. If they
match, authentication is successful. If desired, additional
and potentially signed attributes and other information can
be retrieved from the profile.
Client with
X.509 certificate
and corresponding
key pair
Profile Server
FOAF
Profile
(Web-)Server
corresponding
profile
Server compares
obtained public key
with referenced profile
Figure 1: WebID working principle
As can easily be seen, anyone can issue a self-declared
WebID by simply generating an appropriate certificate and
publishing a corresponding FOAF profile document for it on
a webserver. Why should such a WebID be trusted? Espe-
cially in domains which need higher levels of assurance, for
authentication? Here, clearly the answer is: trust in such
a self-declared WebID is not possible without further mea-
sures.
The search for trust in WebID is a general problem which
can also be found in other systems that use public key cryp-
tography – as for instance classical X.509 certificates for
websites or secure mail. This problem is known for a long
time and in general, two approaches can be distinguished:
the classical, hierarchical PKI2 approach with certificate au-
thorities and the web-of-trust model with peers mutually
signing their keys to establish a graph reflecting trust in
keys. However, web-of-trust is more or less constricted to ap-
plications of PGP[18], amongst other reasons because X.509
certificates do not allow multiple signatures in general and
there is currently no support for such a mode in all standard
implementations. This makes the web-of-trust model thus
not suitable for our case.
Additionally, a third, less generally applicable approach
would be the linking of identities: coupling an identity with
a lower level of trust to another which is more trusted.
We have investigated both ways: linking and adding trust
to WebID itself. For adding trust directly, we searched for
possibilities to integrate WebID with established systems
having known properties. As trust in X.509 certificates is
typically created using the PKI approach, we have opted for
this as well. Detailed descriptions of both approaches will
now be given in the following.
3.2 Interlinking
Interlinking details the process of connecting two identi-
ties and declaring them to be about the same subject. In
the WebID and PKI context, we have devised the following
three methods for interlinking WebIDs:
1. Using a unique key pair shared among certifi-
cates (Figure 2): This method uses only a single
2Public Key Infrastructure
key pair for which two (or more) certificates have been
generated. A certificate contains information about
the corresponding public key which can be duplicated
by a different certificate without any issues.
2. With a single profile referenced from multiple
certificates (Figure 3): In this case, multiple certifi-
cates with independent and corresponding key pairs
relate to the same FOAF profile URI in their SAN
field.
3. By semantically linking key pairs and certifi-
cates from a single FOAF profile (Figure 4):
Here, again we have multiple certificates with inde-
pendent key pairs. This time, however, each of them
points to its own FOAF profile and the relation bet-
ween certificates and profiles is created using addi-
tional metadata in the FOAF profile itself.
Depending on the field of application and the restrictions
given by the PKI in place, one method may have advantages
over another or may not be available at all. For instance, be-
ing given a certificate on a hardware token as with SuisseID,
sharing a key pair as in Method 1 is not an option.
The semantical linking in Method 3 is the most flexible but
comes with the price that the semantics of the link have to
be defined and agreed upon initially. In the other methods,
semantics are given by the extensions of X.509 certificates
and thus are far spread and well known, making integration
and interoperation straightforward.
We think the most practical method for linking identites
is Method 2 – which in turn, however, leaves open the ques-
tion of trust as at least one of the involved certificates will
probably originate from an untrusted source. We describe a
solution for this issue in Section 3.3.
X.509 Certificate 1 X.509 Certificate 2
Profile Server 1
FOAF
Profile
Unique
Key Pair
Profile Server 2
FOAF
Profile
Figure 2: Method 1: Linking with unique key pair
3.3 SuisseID Integration
SuisseID, a PKI operated according to national signature
laws[19] by privately held certificate authorities (accredited
by the state), provides X.509 certificates for authentication
and digital signing on a hardware token. Besides the cer-
tificate, SuisseID also runs an attribute authority which can
provide additional information about the holder of a certifi-
cate, like name, date of birth or gender.
X.509 Certificate 1 X.509 Certificate 2
Key Pair 1
Profile Server
FOAF
Profile
Key Pair 2
Single
Profile
Figure 3: Method 2: Linking with single profile
X.509 Certificate 1 X.509 Certificate 2
Profile Server 1
FOAF
Profile
Key Pair 1
Profile Server 2
FOAF
Profile
Key Pair 2
Explicit
Linking
Figure 4: Method 3: Semantical linking
Being widely recognised, accepted, and having a very high
level of trust, SuisseID seemed to be an ideal partner for
strengthening the LoA of a WebID. Furthermore, the at-
tribute authority functionality could seamlessly be integrated
into the FOAF profile server, thus providing the same at-
tributes with the same level of assurance for the Linked Data
world.
There are two possible ways to achieve the desired strength-
ening of WebID using SuisseID:
• Interlinking identities, as described by us in Section 3.2.
• Extending SuisseID by adding the needed functionality
for WebID to it.
Looking at interlinking, we can derive the following:
Method 1 is not an option for the SuisseID-case, as al-
ready stated in Section 3.2, due to the fact that the key lies
on a hardware token. Method 2 is also not applicable, as
it would require SuisseID to provide a FOAF profile giving
assurance for a key pair generated externally without any
control. As a last option, Method 3 could be applied – re-
quiring, however, to establish a vocabulary for interlinking
identities in a trusted manner between all possible stake-
holders, thus reaching too far for our main objectives.
We have thus chosen the option to extend the existing
SuisseID with WebID functionality – we think that this is
a very interesting option from different points of view: Not
only would it provide a WebID with the highest level of
assurance to each owner of a SuisseID, but it would also
help WebID adoption in general, opening possibilities for a
variety of new scenarios in identity and access management.
Also, extending SuisseID with WebID is technically not a
hard problem: Certificates issued by SuisseID must be ex-
tended to include the proper subject alternate name exten-
sion containing the URI to the corresponding FOAF profile
and the issuing certificate authority must operate a web-
server for serving these FOAF profile documents accord-
ingly.
We have taken on the integration approach as described
and validated it prototypically using the demo SuisseID iden-
tity provider which is included in SuisseID’s SDK[20].
3.4 Concerns
Even though not being a new technology (surfaced end of
2008[21]), WebID has not found broad adoption so far. Hav-
ing deeply investigated possible applications and issues, we
fear that this will not change anytime soon, unfortunately.
What are the reasons for this?
WebID, while looking simple and flexible at first sight, suf-
fers from some issues which have been noted by others[22,
23, 24] before as well. Most notably, the overall user ex-
perience of WebID seriously hinders broad adoption of the
technology.
This issue not only affects WebID but applications of
client certificates in general. User interfaces for interacting
with certificates in modern web browsers are generally ne-
glected and reduced to the bare minimum; leading to a con-
fusing user experience. There has been no visible progress
or intention on the part of browser vendors to change this in
the past and we think, that with the rise of emerging tech-
nologies like FIDO[25], this fact will not change anytime
soon.
Additionally, the world has changed in the meantime and
things have become more and more mobile – or nowadays
even things-centered. Handling of client certificates with
multiple browsers on the same operating system has already
been cumbersome and tends to get impossible with the mul-
titude of devices operated by a single person today; not
speaking of ways to perform certificate management on mo-
bile platforms.
4. USE CASE
4.1 Foundations
Being focused on applied research, the project team started
to investigate possible practical use cases in the second half
of the project. Main goal for this has been to have a live
and working implementation of a near-life workflow in the
form of a PoC and thus to be able to challenge the applica-
tion of WebID regarding our established requirements. We
found the workflows conducted in the enrollment for stud-
ies to be an interesting area and have choosen one specific
workflow regarding the enrollment for master studies as our
exemplary use case. This workflow involves three primary
actors: A student who has successfully obtained a bachelor’s
degree (and may have additional qualifications), the institu-
tion at which this degree has been obtained (called bachelor
university) and finally the institution at which the student
whishes to enroll for master studies (the master university).
Business requirements of this use case have been thor-
oughly analyzed by the project team, leading to a documen-
tation of the current process in place at BFH’s department
of business, health and social work for verifying applications
of students for its master program (see [26]). This analysis
also summarizes attributes and related information concern-
ing metadata about a student’s career so far. The results
of it served as the basis for the development of the PoC –
based on it, we have devised application use cases for all
actors leading to a concept for implementation.
Finally, a fully working prototype has been implemented
according to these specifications; the full code[27] has been
released under the MIT opensource license. We have also
produced a screencast[28] demonstrating the main workflow
between all involved parties
From a technical perspective, PerSemID is a successor of
the CV3.0 project and builds upon the concepts of a per-
sonal, semantic curriculum vitae coming out of it. The archi-
tecture for a corresponding platform for serving and main-
taining such a CV has been defined in CV3.0’s Content Ac-
cess Service[29, 30, 31]. The Content Access Service (CAS)
is a RDF triple store with additional document management
capabilities as well as an access control layer.
4.2 Actors and Their Actions
In a first step, the student prepares a so-called dossier
of application which contains all relevant information about
the degree obtained as well as possible additional data in
form of documents. Provenance of this data is either per-
sonal information entered by the student directly or data ob-
tained from the bachelor university in the bachelor dossier.
The bachelor dossier is issued by the bachelor university as
a single file, containing Linked Data about the degree ob-
tained and possibly also additional documents. Access to
this dossier is limited to the student and it can be inter-
actively downloaded from the bachelor university. All this
data is then stored in the student’s CAS and the student
can freely choose to include/exclude data per application at
a master university. A detail of this process can be seen in
Figure 5.
After having created the dossier of application, the stu-
dent authorizes the master university to access the dossier
by restricting access based on the university’s WebID which
is assumed to be publicly available.
Next, the addressed master university picks up the dossier
by accessing it on the student’s CAS, after having authenti-
cated using its WebID. Following a review of all the material
in the dossier, a decision regarding acceptance to master
studies can be made. Now, the master university in turn
stores its decision on its CAS and authorizes the WebID,
given by the student, to access it.
In the last step, the student finally retrieves the deci-
sion from the master university, again authenticated by its
WebID, and displays it. This can be seen in Figure 6.
4.3 Architecture and Implementation
Given the three main roles, three distinct applications are
needed, one for each of the actors (student, bachelor uni-
versity and master university). For ease of implementation
and consistency in presentation, they have currently been
implemented running on a single system. Separation is per-
Figure 5: Configuration of dossier of application by the student
Figure 6: Display of enrollment decision
formed depending on the authentication of each actor using
a unique, personal WebID.
Being implemented as a classical single page web applica-
tion, the software consists of a server and a client part.
4.3.1 Content Access Service
To our knowledge, there is no ready-made product simi-
lar to a content access service in our notion as specified by
[30], thus the needed functionality for the PoC had to be
implemented in the PoC itself. There is, however, a large
range of (mature) triple stores available – as can be seen for
instance in [32]. For our needs, a triple store must support
SPARQL 1.1 update[33]; together with other requirements
and also based on experience gained in other projects, we
have choosen to use Apache Jena[34].
A deliberately reduced set of document management ca-
pabilities has been implemented in the PoC-code itself.
The CAS serves as storage for all metadata related to each
actor and also as location for all application-specific config-
uration data, like file system paths or granted permissions.
Each actor has their own named graph in the triple store
and we perform a copy-process on import of data between
different actors. An example for the contents of the stu-
dent’s graph, including a granted permission for the WebID
hmsc.example.org can be seen in Listing 1.
Data of the other actors looks similar with respective at-
tributes and values.
Documents, which can be uploaded by the student and
the bachelor university, are given a unique ID and stored on
the file system. Metadata needed by the server for inter-
acting with them is again stored in the triple store, in the
named graph of the respective actor, an example is given in
Listing 2.
Linking to the data of the respective actor is done using
Listing 1 Example data of a student
@base <http :// example.org/Student > .
@prefix rdfs: <http :// www.w3.org /2000/01/
rdf -schema#> .
@prefix xsd: <http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#> .
@prefix s: <http :// persemid.bfh.ch/vocab/
student#> .
<#> a s:Student ;
s:webid <http :// example.org/
StudentWebID > ;
s:name "Dent" ;
s:vorname "Stu" ;
s:zivilstand "single" ;
s:geburtsdatum "1990 -01 -01"^^ xsd:date
;
s:email "stu.dent@example.org" ;
s:strasse "Examplestreet 3" ;
s:plz "1111" ;
s:ort "Exampletown" ;
s:nationalitaet "Swiss" ;
s:heimatort "Hometown" ;
s:wohnortstudba "Studytown" ;
s:wohnort2jahre "Lasttown" ;
s:matrikelnummer "1 -234 -56" ;
s:sozialversicherungsnummer "123456" ;
s:permission <http :// hmsc.example.org/
webid#id> .
the file-predicate of the vocabulary corresponding to the
actor.
4.3.2 Server Application
The whole server application has been written in Java-
Script and is running on node.js[35]. HTTP-functionality
has been realized using the widely deployed middleware layer
connect[36] which makes creation of applications serving a
variety of different requests straightforward. All commu-
nication between the frontend application and the server
runs over a single HTTPS port (HTTPS or more precisely
TLS is required for performing the client certificate retrieval
needed for WebID authentication). The following endpoints
are served by the server:
• Webserver for static content (HTML, CSS. . . )
• Proxy for the triple store
• Server for the WebID profiles (see Section 4.3.3)
• Document upload
• Up- and download of ZIP-exports (see Section 4.3.4)
• AJAX-actions of frontend
Primarily for security purposes (but also for convenience
in deployment), connections to the triple store all pass through
a HTTP-proxy offered as well by the server application.
On both sides, client and server, we make use of new and
advanced JavaScript RDF[37] libraries like rdf-ext[38] and
ld2h[39]. A highlevel overview of the architecture is given in
Figure 7.
Listing 2 Metadata of a file
<http :// example.org/Student #7
aa5c0f9a76e9a62e3104925c6d6bd81 >
s:fileExtension ".pdf" ;
s:fileHandle "7
aa5c0f9a76e9a62e3104925c6d6bd81" ;
s:fileName "Curriculum.pdf" ;
s:fileServerPath "/tmp/psidimas/student
/7 aa5c0f9a76e9a62e3104925c6d6bd81.
pdf" ;
s:fileSize 605660 ;
s:fileType "application/pdf" .
File System Triple Store
Content Access Service
Server
Client
UI Student
UI Bachelor
University
UI Master
University
Figure 7: Overview of architecture
4.3.3 WebID Identity Provider
All functionality needed for WebID authentication has
also directly been implemented in the PoC code itself, based
on our experience in the implementation of the WebIDP[40]
application, an identity provider for WebID developed dur-
ing the CV3.0 project. A dedicated URL of the webserver
serves the FOAF profiles referenced by the client certificates
in use throughout the PoC. An example of such a profile is
given in Listing 3.
The certificates for all actors have been generated directly
using OpenSSL with respective configuration files.
4.3.4 Cross-Domain Triple Store Interaction
As described in Section 4.2, all actors follow a defined
scheme of interaction. In this scheme, there are three data
exchanges between these actors: download of bachelor data
by the student from the bachelor university, download of
data from the student by the master university and finally,
download of data from the master university by the student.
This can be generalized as a concept for sharing data bet-
ween triplestores or cross-domain triple store interaction.
Multiple methods for implementing such interactions could
be thought of, we have considered the following three:
1. Cross-site sharing using HTTP access control, known
as CORS [41]
2. Proxying of data on the server side
3. Explicitly channeling data via client-side application
Listing 3 Exapmple of a generated FOAF profile
@prefix cert: <http :// www.w3.org/ns/auth/
cert#> .
@prefix xsd: <http ://www.w3.org /2001/
XMLSchema#> .
@prefix foaf: <http :// xmlns.com/foaf /0.1/>
.
@prefix rdfs: <http :// www.w3.org
/1999/02/22 -rdf -syntax -ns#> .
<#id> a foaf:Person;
cert:key [ a cert:RSAPublicKey;
cert:modulus "c2bcf492 [ ... ] 680 f885d
"^^xsd:hexBinary;
cert:exponent 65537 ;
] .
Being limited by the same-origin policy[42], that restricts
how a document or script loaded from one origin can inter-
act with a resource from another origin, a direct interaction
between the client-side program logic and the content ac-
cess service of the remote party in an exchange cannot be
implemented – even considering the fact, that in our PoC
scenario, all content was served from the same server.
This problem could be circumvented with HTTP access
control (CORS), which allows for a relaxation of the restric-
tions imposed on the client. By doing so, we would face
another problem: in order to be able to dynamically adjust
the needed HTTP headers, parties exchanging data would
have to know each other in advance – rather an unlikely
situation in a real world scenario.
By closely examining this method, one notices that it
tends to shift control to the server delivering the client appli-
cation; so why not having the server perform the interaction
on behalf of the client anyway? Directly acting as a proxy
for the data to be exchanged?
Being a seemingly straightforward approach, this method
has some serious drawbacks as well. We would have strong
concerns regarding security if the server could be instructed
by the client to act as an open proxy interacting with un-
known destinations. Also, for the purpose of our PoC, hiding
the exchanges between actors is not optimal for the demon-
stration of the implemented functionality.
So we finally set with the third option and have imple-
mented a very explicit data exchange using ZIP-files which
are downloaded by an actor from the remote party and man-
ually imported into their own CAS. While this may look odd
or even ancient at a first glance, it has some great benefits
for our validation work, which amongst others are:
• Explicit WebID authentication and authorization are
possible – our main objective in this case
• Separation of the actors and adminstrative borders are
clearly visible
• Interaction with files is well known to the user
We have thus as well implemented the generation of the
ZIP file including the necessary contents in our server code.
The basic structure of such a file is as follows: In the root-
level directory psidimas (a shortcut used for the PoC), there
are two plain text files: data.nt contains the subset of
triples exported from the respective actor’s triple store in
Turtle[43]-format while psidimas.json is a JSON-file with
processing instructions for the import of the data. Exported
documents are stored by using their internal filehandle in the
files-subdirectory. An example for this structure is given
in Listing 4.
Listing 4 Contents of ZIP file exports
export-student|hbsc|hmsc.zip
psidimas
psidimas.json
data.nt
files
7aa5c0f9a76e9a62e3104925c6d6bd81
...
5. CONCLUSIONS
Both parts of the project were able to respond to the
specific questions which led to them. The results from these
parts are a significant addition to our previous work on iden-
tity and access management intersecting with semantic web
and Linked Data technologies. From our point of view, the
project has thus clearly met its objectives.
By investigating means of strengthening the level of as-
surance in a WebID, we have shown methods for linking of
identities with a focus on WebID. This discussion paved the
way for approaching an integration of WebID with SuisseID,
showing that the integration only makes sense in the direc-
tion of adding WebID functionality to SuisseID and not the
other way round. We have validated these assumptions with
an integration of WebID into the SuisseID SDK.
A further, very relevant result and valuable extension of
previous work, conducted in the CV3.0 project, was then
achieved with the implementation of the prototype. It has
demonstrated, that by using Linked Data technologies, con-
crete and practical administrative workflows can be imple-
mented easily and without hassles. Furthermore, authenti-
cation and authorization using WebID stands the test re-
garding security requirements in that area – an integration
into other, trusted identification systems such as SuisseID
would largely benefit the WebID technology in terms of trust
as well.
The prototype also gave us insights in cross-domain triple
store interaction and thus provided a model for future im-
plementations of processes and workflows based on Linked
Data technologies. During the implementation, we have also
encountered some issues, most notably related to the same
origin policy of modern browsers. For these issues, we have
given an overview of possible solutions and described the
one chosen by us.
Besides technical problems, our research clearly showed
weak points in WebID, some of which have been pointed
out by others before. Regarding broader acceptance of the
technology, as means for authentication and especially as
“token” for permission handling, future work for better in-
tegration, portability and especially userfriendlyness must
be undertaken. Here, we are particularly interested in ap-
proaches taken by recent projects like Solid – and wether
those will be successful in solving these issues.
With the publication of our results, the PerSemID project
which ran for 2.5 years comes to an end. Both projects,
CV3.0 and PerSemID, fit well in our institution’s portfolio
(focusing on identity and access management) and the elab-
orated results will almost certainly be picked up by future
research projects.
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